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This paper examines the implications of introducing a variable rate of time preference on the role of monetary policy 
in a dynamic general equilibrium framework explicitly designed to capture  liquidity effects.  Variable time 
preference is i ncorporated by allowing the discount factor applied to future utility to be decreasing in 
contemporaneous utility.  The model is a more general one, in the sense that the fixed discount factor economy is 
nested as a special case.  Numerical simulations of the more general model indicate that for a range of parameters 
optimal monetary policy can be qualitatively different.  This is in spite of the fact that there are very small 
quantitative differences in the magnitude of monetary non-neutralities, such as liquidity effects, in the fixed and 
flexible discount factor environments. Furthermore, within this range, monetary policy is less activist, in the sense 





1.  Introduction 
 
The negative impact of unanticipated monetary injections on nominal interest rates is central to a number of recent 
papers, including those of Lucas (1990), Fuerst(1992), and Christiano and Eichenbaum(1995).  Common to several 
general equilibrium models that focus on such liquidity effects are assumptions about the nature of trading frictions 
imposed on the economy.  The premise of this class of models is that monetary injections are asymmetric, in that 
they occur through financial intermediaries in the credit market, and that it takes time to move funds from one market 
to another.  In the event of an unanticipated monetary injection, the credit market is temporarily more liquid in 
comparison to the goods market, and nominal interest rates must fall in order to induce borrowers to absorb the 
excess supply of cash.  Short run asymmetric effects of this type are typically generated by assuming that household 
savings decisions are made before the monetary injection is realized.  Cash-in-advance restrictions on all transactions 
of borrowers then ensure that the decline in nominal interest rates translates into an increased demand for real goods 
and services. 
 
The nature of non-neutralities generated by such liquidity models stands in sharp contrast to those obtained in 
standard cash-in-advance models, which focus primarily on anticipated inflation effects of monetary shocks, and thus 
generate a negative correlation between monetary injections and real activity.  The emphasis on the consequences of 
unanticipated monetary injections essentially arises from the assumptions about the timing of events, and the 
predictions of the two types of cash-in-advance models are not necessarily in conflict with each other.  To be 
specific, t he long run predictions of the two types of models is essentially the same – in the steady state, the 
correlation between money growth and output is negative.  In a liquidity model, the temporary inflexibility in the 
savings decisions of individuals is the key to the short run negative money-output correlation.  At the empirical level, 
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although evidence on whether liquidity effects are an important “stylized fact” is not sufficiently conclusive, it has 
been persuasive enough to make liquidity models very popular in recent years. 
 
In view of the differential impact of monetary shocks, another interesting issue that arises in the context of liquidity 
models relates to the role of monetary policy.  While the role of monetary policy has been extensively investigated in 
standard cash-in-advance models, it is a relatively unexplored issue in the framework of liquidity models.  Fuerst’s 
(1994) paper, for example, demonstrates differences in optimal monetary policy arising as a result of trading frictions 
that are unique to this class of models.  In particular, Fuerst demonstrates that, for a range of preference parameters, 
monetary policy can be strongly activist, in the sense that it is countercyclical to productivity shocks.  This is an 
interesting result, since standard cash-in-advance models typically fail to yield an activist role for monetary policy 
even though significant non-neutralities are present. 
 
This paper examines the implications of introducing an endogenous individual rate of time preference on the role of 
monetary policy in a liquidity effect framework.  The benchmark model studied in this paper is that of Fuerst (1992, 
1994), and endogenous time preference is incorporated by replacing the fixed utility discount factor by a discount 
factor that is a function of contemporaneous utility, and is hence affected by the levels of consumption and leisure.  
Preferences are then no longer time additive, although they remain recursive, as in fixed discount factor 
environments.  Epstein (1983) postulates conditions under which such preferences are consistent with expected 
utility, and the dynamic stability of models with such preferences
1.  One of the assumptions involved is that the 
discount factor is decreasing in utility, reflecting the idea that individuals become more “impatient” with increases in 
current utility benefits.   
 
The motivation for incorporating such preferences is that they are more general, in the sense that the fixed discount 
factor environment is nested as a special case.  It is therefore desirable to check whether conclusions emerging from 
standard frameworks are retained when the assumption of variable time preference is relaxed.  Allowing flexibility in 
the discount factor in the context of this paper is somewhat similar in spirit to the exercise conducted by Braun 
(1994), who demonstrates differences in optimal monetary policy arising due to small modifications of preferences in 
a standard Cooley and Hansen (1991) type cash-in-advance framework.  Standard cash-in-advance models typically 
yield the Friedman rule as the optimal policy: inflation tax distortions are eliminated by deflating at a rate of money 
growth equal to the rate of time preference.  Braun considers a broader class of preferences, which allow for special 
cases in which a positive inflation tax may be optimal.  He also finds the estimates of the preference parameters to be 
within the range in which such special cases are nested.  In liquidity effect models, differences in optimal policy arise 
due to the presence of an additional distortion – the inability of agents to move funds across sectors immediately 
after the shock is observed.  Fuerst (1994) shows that the presence of this additional distortion can imply an activist 
countercyclical role for monetary policy, as opposed to the deterministic non-activist role typically implied by 
models in which the Friedman rule is optimal.  An activist contercyclical role for monetary policy is typically 
difficult to find within cash-in-advance frameworks, even in the case of cash-in-advance models with Keynesian 
features, such as the endogenous sticky-price model of Ireland (1996)
2.  Modifying preferences by introducing 
endogenous time preference further changes the role of policy by altering the conditions it needs to satisfy in order to 
remove both inflation tax and liquidity distortions.   
 
In addition to exploring the role of monetary policy, this paper also analyzes the impact of flexibility in the rate of 
time preference on liquidity effects, and other monetary non-neutralities, such as anticipated inflation effects.  It must 
be emphasized that the analysis of the effects of variable time preference on liquidity effects per se is not the focus of 
this paper.  Nevertheless, it is useful and essential in motivating the differences in the role of monetary policy in the 
fixed and flexible time preference environments.  A number of numerical experiments in this paper are therefore 
devoted to the analysis of liquidity effects and other type of monetary non-neutralities.  It turns out that, qualitatively 
speaking, variable time preference models produce non-neutralities that are similar to fixed time preference models.  
However, quantitatively, these non-neutralities can be different.  For example, liquidity effects of monetary shocks 
                                                           
1   The original formulation is due to Uzawa (1968), which was extended and refined recently in Epstein’s work. 
2  Here, as in Ireland (1996), were identifying the term “activist” with monetary policy that is countercyclical to productivity 
shocks.  Procyclical and deterministic monetary policy is considered “non-activist”. 
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can be smaller or larger in the presence of variable time preference, depending on the parameters of the model.  
Also, monetary policy that is procyclical to productivity shocks amplifies fluctuations in output to a greater degree in 
a variable time preference model, while countercyclical monetary policy dampens fluctuations in output to a greater 
degree. 
 
The point we want to make here, and this is the main finding of this paper, is that although variable time preference 
produces qualitatively similar monetary non-neutralities, its implications for the role of monetary policy can be very 
different.  This is confirmed by means of two types of quantitative experiments.  In one experiment, we explicitly 
calculate the optimal monetary policy using a first best approach.  For an isoelastic representation of the period 
utility function, optimal monetary policy is qualitatively different in the variable time preference model for values of 
the risk aversion parameter  s  greater than 1 and less than approximately 1.17.  In this range, optimal monetary 
policy is procyclical to productivity shocks for the variable time preference model, but countercyclical to 
productivity shocks in the fixed time preference model
3.  In another experiment, we compute the welfare costs of 
different types of monetary policies in which money growth is constrained to be positive.  The results of the second 
experiment also support the conclusions of the first experiment.  The analysis of this paper therefore seems to 
confirm the non-activist nature of monetary policy that is typically found in the literature, as opposed to the activist 
nature of monetary policy in a fixed time preference liquidity effect framework such as that of Fuerst (1992, 1994).  
Even in cases where the optimal policy is qualitatively similar, carrying out the optimal policy is a more difficult task 
if the economy is characterized by variable time preference. 
 
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the economic environment, which 
can be described as an extension of the Fuerst (1992, 1994) models, and briefly discusses the impact of money 
growth shocks on nominal interest rates.  Section 3 analyses the results based on numerical simulations of the model.  
Section 4 concludes.   
 
2.  The Economic Environment 
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where the endogenous discount factor  ) (u b must be of the form  e
u -f( ) ,  f( ) u > 0, in order to be consistent with 
expected utility, as shown in Epstein (1983).  Also,  t t t t AL c L c u - = - ) log( ) 1 , ( ,  0 > A , represents the household's 
time-t momentary utility, defined over consumption  ct , and leisure,  t L - 1
4.  The function  u u t h f + = ) ( , so that an 
increase in utility causes a decrease in the discount factor - the household becomes more impatient with respect to 
future utility. The function u must be negative, strictly increasing with ln( ) -u  convex in the composite consumption-
leisure good.  It is also required that f  is positive, increasing, strictly concave and that  ) (u e u f ¢  is nonincreasing
5. 
                                                           
3    The estimates of s are usually known to lie between 1 and 2.  See, for example, Prescott (1986). 
4   While most of the analysis in this paper assumes logarithmic utility, we also conduct some experiments with the broader class 
in which  AL
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, where  1 = s  is the log utility case. 
5  These restrictions ensure that a stable steady state distribution for the state variables exists and is unique.  Epstein (1983) also 
shows that, under these conditions, consumption is a normal good in every period , and that deviations from the fixed time 
preference set up are not too great.  Although these conditions are specified for the case in which the utility function has only 
one argument, viz. consumption, results in Epstein (1983) should go through if consumption and leisure are treated as a 
composite commodity.  Restrictions specified in Epstein (1983) should then be satisfied w.r.t. this composite commodity. 
(See, for example, Gomme and Greenwood (1995) and Mendoza (1991)).   4
 
The households in this economy purchase consumption goods from firms, which produce a homogeneous 
consumption-investment good, using a stochastic production technology.  This technology is of the Cobb-Douglas 
form, given by 
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where  t H  is the labor services firms purchase from households.  The vector  S st ˛  denotes the state of the economy 
at time t.  The positive and continuous variable  ) ( t s q  represents productivity shocks in the goods sector. 
 
To introduce money into the economy, cash in advance constraints are imposed on all purchases carried out by both 
consumers and firms.  The cash in advance constraint on consumers is given by 
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where  t M  is the amount of money balances the household holds at the beginning of period t, and  t N  is the portion 
of these balances that the household deposits with intermediaries in the financial sector. 
 
Firms, on the other hand, use  t B  units of cash borrowed from financial intermediaries in the credit market to finance 
purchases of  t H  units of labor services from households.  The cash in advance constraint on firms is thus given by 
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Finally, the financial sector of the economy consists of  financial intermediaries who accept cash deposits  t N  from 
households, in addition to receiving the monetary injection  t X  from the central bank
6.  The central bank supplies 




t X M M + = +1 , where  Mt
s is the beginning of period  t nominal money supply.  The 
financial intermediaries thus have  t t X N +  units of cash available for loaning out to the firms. 
 
Apart from frictions arising due to the imposition of cash in advance restrictions, an additional friction arises due to 
the household's inability to alter its savings decision after observing the monetary injection.  Since the monetary 
injection occurs asymmetrically via the financial sector, and funds cannot be moved from on location to another, the 
monetary injection will have distributional effects.  This feature of the model is similar to some earlier models of the 
liquidity effect, studied by Grossman and Weiss (1983), and Rotemberg (1984).  In these economies, goods and 
financial markets are separated, and only half the agents are in the financial market in any given period.  The money 
injection is therefore asymmetric, since only the agents in the financial market receive it.  In these economies, 
however, the distributional effects are allowed to persist forever.  Since this makes the analysis of money shocks 
somewhat intractable, the authors are confined to examining the effects of a one time monetary injection in an 
otherwise deterministic setting. 
 
To abstract from such wealth effects, we use the representative family assumption of the more recent liquidity 
models discussed in the previous section.  The financial structure of this model is similar to that of Fuerst (1992).  It 
is convenient, at this point, to reiterate Fuerst's (1992) interpretation of the timing of events and the nature of 
transactions specific to this structure.  We assume that the economy is populated with a large number of “families” 
which consist of members that engage in different trades.  A representative family consists of a worker-shopper pair, 
a firm manager, and a financial intermediary.  At the beginning of the period the representative family starts with 
t M  units of money balances, and chooses to deposit  t N  units with the financial intermediary.  The family then 
                                                           
6   Fuerst(1994) assumes that a fixed fraction of the injection goes to the shopper in the goods market.  The model here assumes 
that all of the monetary injection is given only to the financial intermediary.  Dropping the assumption that the shopper gets 
part of the injection is not crucial to the results of the paper, and simplifies the analysis considerably.    5
separates and each member travels to distinct locations, after which the state of the world - the monetary shock and 
the technology shock, are revealed.  The shopper is in the goods market to purchase goods for consumption, while 
the worker offers  t L  units of labor in the labor market.  The firm and financial intermediary are in the credit market.  
The firm borrows  t t t X N B + =  dollars from the financial intermediary, to be repaid at the end of the period at a 
positive nominal interest rate of  t R , and then travels to the labor market.  The firm then offers to hire t H  units of 
labor at the nominal wage rate of  t W .  Using the borrowings  t B  to finance the wage bill, the firm uses labor services 
to produce output for sale in the goods market.  Liquidity effects arise in this model in the same sense as in Fuerst 
(1992): A large monetary injection implies that interest rates must fall in order to induce firms to induce firms to 
absorb the excess cash in the financial market.  The excess cash in the hands of the firm also stimulates labor 
demand, and consequently employment and output.   
 
At the end of the period, the firm repays the loan from the financial intermediary, and all members of the 
representative family reunite and pool their cash receipts.  The family therefore enters period t+1 with money 
balances given by 
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The representative family's optimization problem thus involves choosing  t N ,  t c ,  t L ,  t B , and  t H  to maximize 
preferences given by (1), subject to constraints (3)-(5). 
 
Since all nominal variables in the economy grow at the same rate as the nominal money supply, we rescale all 



































x = , denote the rescaled nominal variables.  We further assume that  t x  is i.i.d.  The 
household's dynamic programming problem is then given by  
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where  ) , ( t t s m V  represents the value function corresponding to the family's problem. 
 
The equilibrium conditions in the goods market, the money market, the labor market, the credit market, and the 
capital market are respectively given by 
   
               ) 10 ( ), , ( 1 + = t t t s H f c  
 
and  1 1 = = + t t m m ,  t t H L = ,  t t t x n b + = .  Denote by  t 1 l  and  t 2 l  the Lagrangian multipliers associated with 
constraints (7) and (8) respectively.  After imposing the equilibrium conditions, the first order conditions for  t n ,  t c , 
t L ,  t b ,  t H ,  1 + t k ,  t 1 l , and  t 2 l  may be expressed as 
   6
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The equilibrium conditions above collapse to their fixed time preference versions when we set  ) (u b¢ equal to zero, 
and replace the endogenous discount factor by a fixed discount factor.  As shown in Fuerst (1992), we can illustrate 
the presence of a ‘liquidity effect component’ in interest rates, in addition to standard Fisherian fundamentals.  Using 
equations (12), (14), and (18), for example, we can derive, 
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In the above expression, and from now on we have surpressed the arguments of various functions for notational 
convenience, and to economize on space.  In the absence of a flexible discount factor, and also of liquidity effects, 





1 2 l l -
, equation (21) implies a Fisherian decomposition of nominal interest rates   7
into the real rate of interest, and an anticipated inflation component.  In the fixed time preference economy with 
liquidity effects, an asymmetric monetary injection through the financial market will change the relative marginal 
value of cash in the goods market and the financial market, so that  1 2 l l < .  Holding the anticipated inflation effect 
fixed, this implies that nominal interest rates will be lower than predicted by Fisherian fundamentals.  This is also 
true of the endogenous time preference economy.  However, introducing variability in the discount factor clearly 
affects the relative roles of the liquidity component and the Fisherian components in determining interest rates: in 
some sense, the weights assigned to each of these components is now different.  The flexible discount factor 
economy is then potentially consistent with stronger as well as weaker liquidity effects, relative to the fixed discount 
factor economy.  Furthermore, in addition to liquidity effects and Fisherian effects, there is now an additional source 
of variability in nominal interest rates.   Since the nature and extent of monetary non-neutralities may be different, it 
is also natural to expect that the role of monetary policy will not be the same as in the constant time preference 
framework.  
 
3.  Analysis of Quantitative Experiments 
 
We can characterize an equilibrium for this economy in essentially the same fashion as in Fuerst (1992).  Consider 
the case in which the cash-in-advance constraint binds in all states of the world.  The state is, as mentioned before, 
assumed to be i.i.d.  Also, for the purpose of the numerical experiments of this section, we let the number of states be 
four.  Two steps are involved in characterizing the economy’s equilibrium:  First, we obtain expressions for 
t t t t t R w p , , , , 2 1 l l  in terms of  , , , m t t V L n  and V .  These are derived using equations (16), (17), (12), (15), and (14), 
and are respectively given by 
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Note that, since we have assumed shocks to be i.i.d, it is natural to conjecture that  n and  m V  are constants.  In 
addition, let us assume  t t t t AL c L c u - = - ) log( ) 1 , ( , and  g q t t t L s t f c ) ( ) ( 1 + = = .  Then, substituting the expressions 
for  , , , , 2 1 t t t t w p l l  into equations (11), (13), and (16), we see that the equilibrium is represented by  constants 
n ˛( , ) 01 , Vm > 0, V , and a function  Lt ˛( , ) 01  that satisfy 
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in addition to the Bellman equation, which is given by,  
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Solving this system involves using an initial guess for  ) 2 ( + t V ,  1 + t c , and  1 + t L to compute  ) 1 ( + t V
7.  We can then 
use (25)-(28) to solve for  n ,  m V  , and the  1 4·  vector  L  and update the guesses for  ) 2 ( + t V ,  ct+1, and  Lt+1, for 
the next iteration.  This procedure is repeated until  7 10
) 2 (
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A.  Liquidity Effects and Other Monetary Non-neutralities 
 
We now consider the results of numerical simulations of the model, in order to examine the nature of monetary non-
neutralities in the  fixed and flexible discount factor economies. Tables 1 -5 present the simulations for this 
subsection.  The purpose of this subsection is to establish that the nature of monetary non-neutralities can be very 
similar for both models.  The next subsection then demonstrates that optimal monetary policy can be very different in 
spite of these similarities.  
 
Consider, for example Table 1which examines the liquidity effects of an unanticipated monetary injection.  Here, the 
productivity shock   1 ” q , so the four states of the economy correspond to money growth rates of 3%, 5%, 7%, and 
9%, and there are no real sources of uncertainty in this economy.  In addition, we set  64 . = g , and  75 . = A
8.  We 
choose  8 . = t .  The parameter h  is chosen such that the initial steady state of the discount factor coincides with that 
of the fixed time preference model.  The upper panel in each of these tables presents the flexible discount factor 
economy, while the lower panel presents the corresponding fixed discount factor version.   Comparing the fixed and 
flexible discount factor economies studied in Table 1, we observe that monetary injections have qualitatively similar 
effects in both cases.  There is a liquidity effect in both economies: interest rates are decreasing in the monetary 
injection.  Lower interest rates imply a lower opportunity cost of using cash to finance purchases of labor, so that 
equilibrium work effort, and therefore output are increasing in  x .  To hire more units of labor, the firm has to offer a 
higher nominal wage, which is thus increasing in  x .  The current price level, on the other hand, is decreasing in  x , 
since the shopper in the goods market has a fixed supply of cash and the increased supply of output must bring down 
prices
9.  Another way to illustrate liquidity effects is to compare the marginal value of cash in the goods and financial 
markets, given by  t 1 l  and  t 2 l  respectively - in both economies  t 1 l  is increasing in the monetary injection while 
t 2 l  is decreasing in the monetary injection. 
                                                           
7   We use the steady states of the fixed time preference model as initial guesses.  For some parameter values it was not possible 
to compute an equilibrium. 
8    The value of g  chosen is the same as that in Fuerst (1992).  In Fuerst’s (1994) paper g  is assumed stochastic, so that there 
are two types of productivity shocks in the economy.  In his analysis of optimal monetary policy Fuerst therefore considers two 
types of experiments:  In one case, g  is held fixed and q  is allowed to vary, and the opposite in another.  The experiments 
considered in this paper analogous to the former case.  The choice of A=.75 was dictated by computational tractability. 
9   Allowing variability in capital may cause prices to increase in the money shock - a feature more acceptable in light of the 
conventional view that money shocks cause the price level to increase.  Alternatively if a fraction of the monetary injection is 
allowed to go into the goods market, as in Fuerst (1994), prices may be increasing in  x .  In this paper, however, we are 
focusing only on supply side effects of the money shocks.   9
However, Table 1 illustrates that the endogenous discount factor economy may be potentially consistent with larger 
liquidity effects, in the sense that larger than average monetary injections produce a larger than average fall in 
interest rates compared to the fixed discount factor economy.  Compare, for example the rows which present the 
variables relative to their means.  Work effort, and consequently consumption are now a little more responsive to 
changes in the money growth rate.  Monetary injections can therefore have a greater positive impact on real activity.  
One may wish to assign the following interpretation to this outcome. The discount factor, as shown in Table 1 is 
decreasing in the monetary injection.  This “impatience” with respect to current consumption benefits translates into 
larger increases in contemporaneous consumption, output and work effort
10.  Liquidity effects in the variable time 
preference are also amplified in another sense.  Note that the monetary injection,  x n+ , is  lower than in the 
benchmark model, and yet the model produces a steeper money-interest rate relation.  The impatience induced by a 





n =  compared to the 
fixed time preference case.  As noted by Fuerst (1993), although the monetary injection causes aggregate money 




















.  Other things being equal, the magnitude of the liquidity effect is strictly decreasing 
in equilibrium  nt , implying a larger liquidity effect in the variable time preference economy.  
 
It is important at this point to mention that, the opposite case – in which the impact of monetary injections is slightly 
weaker in the variable discount factor economy – is also possible.  Experiments with different combinations of q   
and  A  (which are not reported here) showed this to be the case, the results again being qualitatively similar in both 
economies, with very small quantitative differences.  Furthermore, although we observe a positive correlation 
between monetary injections and real activity there is no exploitable Phillips curve type trade-off in any of the cases 
presented here.  If, for example, we increase the mean of the monetary injection, real activity in both economies will 
be lower in all states of the world.  The presence of such inflation tax or anticipated inflation effects was confirmed 
using numerical simulations, which are not reported here.  Inflation tax effects are also illustrated in Table 2, which 
presents the deterministic versions of the economies studied in Tables 1.  These effects are well known to all cash-in-
advance models.  In both economies, inflation tax distortions cause substitution out of cash goods (consumption and 
work effort), towards credit goods (leisure), as money growth increases from 5% to 10%.   
 
The small quantitative differences discussed above may, however, may lead one to expect that the role of monetary 
policy is not likely to be very different in the presence of endogenous time preference.  However, as will be shown in 
the next subsection, and this is the key point of the paper, for a wide range of parameters a different role for 
monetary policy is likely to emerge.  This difference arises due to the presence of uncertainty in the real sector of the 
economy.  To see this, consider equilibrium work effort in the variable discount factor economy, which is implicitly 
given by 
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and compare it with its fixed time preference version 
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10 Clearly, this is just an interpretation. A different outcome is quite plausible, given that utility depends on both consumption 
and leisure.  The parameters  A , q  and g  are relevant to the labor-leisure decision - lower work effort implies a higher level 
of leisure and hence utility.  On the other hand output is lower, so that utility is lower.  The flexible time preference model is 
thus consistent with higher as well as lower levels of leisure than in the fixed time preference case.   10
In the case of  i.i.d. shocks,  ) 1 ( + t Vm  is a constant, and is independent of the productivity shock q . This implies that 
work effort in the fixed time preference economy is independent of q , unless the monetary injection varies with q .  
In the flexible discount factor economy, however, work effort is affected by q  via the discount factor.  Other things 
being equal, an increase in utility will cause the numerator to fall and the denominator to increase since 
0 )) ( ( > ¢ ¢ t u b , so that work effort may be decreasing inq , since q  positively affects utility.  In any case, work effort 
is not independent of  q  in the variable time preference economy.  This suggests that the nature and extent of the 
impact of monetary injections on the variablity of output will be different in the two economies.  Furthermore, the 
role of monetary policy will not be the same, which motivates some of the analysis in subsection B below. 
 
The next three simulations examined are presented in Tables 3-5, all of which allow  q  to vary across states .  
Furthermore, the average monetary injection is 5% in all of the cases considered.  In Table 3 we illustrate a case in 
which monetary policy is deterministic, so that  Cov x ( , ) q = 0.  Tables 4 and 5 represent countercyclical 
(Cov x ( , ) . q = - 0033) and procyclical monetary policy (Cov x ( , ) . q = 0033) respectively.  Again, in both economies 
procyclical policy has the effect of amplifying fluctuations in output (consumption), while countercyclical policy 
dampens them.  Flexibility in the rate of time preference, however, affects the extent to which these fluctuations are 
amplified or dampened.  Moving from deterministic to procyclical monetary policy amplifies fluctuations by 27.6% 
in the variable discount factor economy, and by 25.1% in the fixed time preference case
11.  Moving from 
deterministic to countercyclical policy decreases fluctuations in the variable discount factor economy by 25.4%, and 
in the fixed discount factor economy by 22.9%.  In some sense, there is an additional channel through which 
monetary policy affects fluctuations in the variable time preference economy  - household decisions are now 
indirectly affected by changes in their utility discount factor. 
 
Again, note that simulations 3-5 confirm work effort in the flexible time preference economy to be decreasing in q , 
while it is independent of  q  in the fixed time preference economy.  The intuition for this behavior is fairly 
straightforward.  In both economies, the representative family, in effect, allocates cash for employment purposes 
before q  is observed.  The firm thus has a supply of cash ( x n+ ) for hiring workers that is independent of q .  The 
worker in the fixed time preference economy bases his current work effort decision on the nominal wage rate, since 
the state of the economy is i.i.d. The nominal wage is in turn determined by the fixed supply of cash.  The worker 
and the firm in the endogenous time preference economy, however, behave differently, since they are members of a 
family that becomes more impatient for current utility as q  increases.  For a fixed level of q , increasing leisure has 
a direct and positive effect on utility, and also an indirect negative effect via the fall in output.  If q , on the other 
hand is increasing across states, an increase in leisure implies less of a sacrifice in terms of the decrease in current 
utility.  Work effort in the variable discount factor framework is thus decreasing in q .  This feature of the model has 
interesting implications for optimal monetary policy, as will become clear from the discussion below.  
 
B.  Welfare Costs and Optimal Monetary Policy 
 
In this subsection we discuss monetary policies designed to make competitive equilibrium Pareto optimal.  We also 
compute welfare costs associated with policies that deviate from the optimum.  We emphasize that the purpose of 
computing welfare costs is not intended for comparison of the levels of these costs across the fixed and variable 
discount factor economies.  Such a comparison would be inappropriate since the preferences in the two economies 
are different.  The reason for performing a second best exercise of this type is essentialy the same as that in Fuerst 
(1994): the optimal policies, as we will see below, need not be unique, but may nevertheless be taken seriously, since 
they are qualitatively similar to solutions of the second best problem. 
 
In order to compute welfare costs, we first need to discuss what conditions must be imposed on the economy for 
monetary policy to be optimal.  The analysis here is similar to that of Fuerst (1994).  As in the fixed time preference 
economy, welfare costs arise due to two types of frictions.  Firstly, there are cash-in-advance constraints on various 
transactions, so that there are inflation tax distortions that can only be eliminated by deflation.  Secondly, there is an 
additional friction imposed due to the inability of the representative family to transfer funds between goods and 
                                                           
11   We can get larger differences for some parameter values.   11
financial markets, which has the effect of making the financial market relatively more liquid.  Intuitively, then, one 
would expect optimal monetary policy to be one that varies with productivity shocks, since monetary shocks must be 
such that the marginal value of cash in the goods and financial markets is equated. 
 
To eliminate inflation tax effects, we must allow  x  to take negative values, i.e., impose, following Fuerst (1994), 
1 - > x .  In addition, optimal work effort, by definition is given by  Lt  that solves 
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From the first order conditions for this economy, the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal (or work effort is 
equal to the above expression), iff  t t t " = = , 0 2 1 l l .  It can be easily verified that  0 2 1 = = t t l l  iff
12 
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An additional condition is needed to ensure stationary equilibrium - cash in advance constraints must bind in at least 
one state so that the above expressions hold with equality for at least one state of the world.  If the above two 
conditions are satisfied then the equilibrium condition above (27) collapses to  
 












and  Lt  is implicitly given by 
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Optimal monetary equilibrium in the endogenous time preference economy is thus given by a function  x S R : ﬁ , 
and constants n ˛( , ) 01 ,  0 > m V , such that 
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where the arguments in the utility function are given by  g q ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 + + + = t t t s L s s c , and  ) 1 , 0 ( : ﬁ S L is given by (37).  
These conditions collapse to the definition of optimal monetary policy in the  fixed time preference version if we set 
                                                           
12   We use equations (12), (15), and the non-binding constraints.   12
0 )) ( ( = ¢ t u b , and  b b ” )) ( ( t u .  Equation (36), of course, represents the endogenous time preference equivalent of 
the stochastic version of the Friedman rule, which arises in several cash-in-advance models.  Equations (34) and 
(35), on the other hand, are of the type that have been shown by Fuerst (1994) to arise in the context of liquidity 
effect models.  As in the case of fixed time preference models, the conditions above allow a lot of flexibility, so that 
optimal monetary policy need not be unique. 
 
To illustrate the differences in optimal monetary policy in the fixed and flexible time preference models, let us first 
consider the deterministic version of the model discussed above.  Since there is no uncertainty, we have  2 1 l l =
13, 
so that there are no distortions arising because of frictions associated with liquidity effects.  Optimal monetary policy 
is therefore required only to take care of inflation tax distortions.  Equation (360) implies that optimal monetary 
policy is given by  1 ) ( - = u x b .  The fixed time preference version is simply the Friedman rule  1 - = b x , and it is 
quite clear that optimal monetary policy can, at least in a quantitative sense, be different in the presence of 
endogenous time preference.  Equilibrium  n  and  m V   are given by deterministic versions of (34) and (35), in which 
these equations must hold with equality in all states. 
 










, equation (33) implies that optimal labor is given by 
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and this is also true of the fixed time preference economy
14.  Optimal monetary policy in both economies then varies 
with the degree of risk aversion s .  In the log utility case, s =1, and income and substitution effects exactly offset 
each other, so that optimal work effort is independent of productivity shocks.  For  s <1, the substitution effect is 
dominant implying that optimal work effort is increasing in productivity shocks, while for  s >1, income effects 
dominate, so that optimal work effort is decreasing in productivity shocks. 
 
Now consider competitive equilibrium work effort in the two economies.  As discussed before, competitive 
equilibrium work effort in the fixed time preference economy is independent of  q , while in the endogenous time 
preference economy it is likely to be decreasing in q  - this is also confirmed by the numerical simulations studied 
above.  Optimal work effort for both economies, on the other hand is given by equation (37).  In the fixed time 
preference economy it is clear that for s <1, optimal monetary policy is likely to be procyclical, as we want work 
effort to be increasing in  q .  Furthermore, for s >1, countercyclical policy is required, while for  s = 1, optimal 
monetary policy is likely to be deterministic (-  i.e. fixed independently of  q ).  However, given that competitive 
equilibrium work effort is decreasing in q  in the endogenous discount factor economy, optimal monetary policy will 
evidently not be deterministic, as in the fixed time preference model.  Consider for example the log utility case 
presented in Tables 3 -5.  Since optimal labor is independent of  q , optimal monetary policy w ould entail 
counteraction of the effect of productivity shocks, which cause work effort to fall in the good states.  Since 
competitive equilibrium work effort is increasing in the money injection, this would be achieved by procyclical 
monetary policy.  This intuition is confirmed when we look at  Table 6, in which welfare costs expressed relative to 
mean consumption are computed for the alternative monetary policies presented in Tables 3-5
15.  While the reduction 
                                                           
13   To see this, note that equations (11) and (14) imply  t t E E 2 1 l l = . 




15   The welfare cost under any monetary policy is implicitly defined by  c D that solves: 
                                 )], ˆ 1 , ˆ ( [ )] 1 , ( [ * * L c u E L c c u E - = - D +    13
in welfare losses in moving from deterministic to activist monetary policy are extremely marginal in the fixed time 
preference case, procyclical policy is clearly the best alternative in the endogenous time preference framework
16.   
 
To explicitly calculate an optimal monetary policy that achieves a l evel of labor given by (33), and has the 
characteristics described above, we follow the strategy pursued in Fuerst (1994).  Since optimal monetary policy is 
obviously not unique, we search for optimal monetary equilibrium within the class in which the cash-in-advance 
constraint in the financial market is “just binding”, so that  0 2 1 = = l l , and  wL x n = + .  In terms of the definition 
of optimal policy above this means that (31) holds with for all  S st ˛ +1 .  Then (30) and (31) imply 
 









) 1 ( g
  
 
and with equality for some  s S t+ ˛ 1 .  Equilibrium n  in the flexible (as well as fixed) discount factor economy is then 
given by 
 








with equality for some s S t+ ˛ 1 . Since the R.H.S. is decreasing in x, 
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Optimal monetary policy can then be numerically computed by iterating on the Bellman equation (28) and using 
(38)-(40) to compute  m V n, , and  x  at each step of the iteration, until convergence is achieved.  Table 7 presents 
optimal monetary policy for the log utility case, which, as expected, is procyclical for the endogenous time 
preference model, (given by  ] 0848 . , 0919 . , 0989 . , 1060 . [ - - - - = x ), and deterministic for the fixed time preference 










 are summarized in Figure 1.  Since an endogenous discount factor appears to have the same effect in 
the log utility case as would be the impact of decreasing the level of risk aversion, we would expect that for the 
1 < s case, optimal monetary policy will be even more procyclical.  The case  1 > s , on the other hand, may reduce 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
where  * c and  * L  denote competitive equilibrium consumption and labor, and  c ˆ  and  L ˆ  denote optimal consumption and 
labor.  
16 An interesting extension would be to study how welfare costs would be affected by the interaction of monetary and fiscal 
policies.  In cash-in-advance models that focus on inflation tax effects, the presence of other distortionary taxes has been 
shown to double welfare costs of inflationary policies.  See for example Cooley and Hansen (1991).    14
the role for procyclical policy, and for relatively large  s  we would expect optimal monetary policy to be 
countercyclical, but to a lesser degree than in the fixed time preference case.  We can confirm this intuition 
numerically as shown in Figure 1.  Also note that the interval in which monetary policy is qualitatively different 
corresponds roughly to  ) 17 . 1 , 1 ( ˛ s .  According to Prescott (1986) the range in which estimates of this parameter 
lie corresponds to [1, 2], with more plausible values being “close to 1”.  An activist countercyclical role for monetary 
policy is typically difficult to find within cash-in-advance frameworks, even in the case of cash-in-advance models 
with Keynesian features such as the endogenous sticky-price model of Ireland (1996).  The analysis here, in some 
sense, confirms earlier conclusions about non-activist monetary policy.  There are, however, plausible ranges for s  
for which optimal policy is qualitatively similar in both economies.  For  17 . 1 > s , for example, activism on part of 
the central bank ha a welfare improving role in both economies.  However, as we have seen above, the conditions 
required for optimality are far more complicated in the variable time preference economy.  That is, it may not be 
possible to implement the optimal policy, since more information is required relative to the fixed time preference 
case. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
This paper can be described as an extension of Fuerst’s (1994) work, which characterizes the nature of optimal 
monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with two types of distortions.  One of these frictions is due to the 
presence of cash-in-advance restrictions.  The second friction arises due to the assumption that goods and financial 
markets are segmented, so that expansionary monetary policy shocks can temporarily lower the equilibrium interest 
rate, and thus lead to a liquidity effect.  Fuerst shows that these features can imply, (for a range of parameters), that 
the appropriate monetary policy is one which responds in an activist countercyclical manner to real shocks that hit 
the economy.  This paper extends Fuerst’s by allowing the representative agent’s discount factor to be endogenous, 
in a manner suggested by Epstein (1983).  The paper demonstrates that while conclusions regarding the response of 
the economy to monetary shocks are not at risk from this generalization, the nature of optimal monetary policy can 
change in some cases.  Furthermore, even in cases where the nature of optimal policy does not change, carrying out 
the appropriate policy is a more complicated exercise.  The central bank now requires information on the preference 
parameters relating to subjective discount rates, which are not directly observable, in addition to other fundamentals 
such as the nature of productivity shocks. 
 
The conclusions here are, of course, subject to similar caveats as the Fuerst’s (1994).  As in that paper, we assume 
that shocks to the economy are i.i.d, and that there is no capital accumulation.  These assumptions, however allow 
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n Vm = = . ; . 3187 1124  
                   b t
h t ( ) , .
( ) u e
u = =
- + 08;            
u c L c AL A t t t t ( , ) log( ) , . 1 075 - = - = ; 
                  c s L t t t = = + q g
g ( ) , . 1 064  
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
x   .03  .05  .07  .09  .06  .0258 
q   1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0 
Consumption  .7268  .7436  .7597  .7750  .7513  .0208 
Labor  .6073  .6295  .6509  .6715  .6398  .0276 
Interest Rates  1.2502  1.1824  1.1216  1.0667  1.1552  .0790 
Price Level  .9374  .9161  .8967  .8790  .9073  .0251 
Wage Rate   .5742  .5858  .5972  .6087  .5915  .0418 
l1  1.2458  1.4375  1.6203  1.7952  1.5247  .2364 
l 2  2.5165  1.7905  1.1660  .6257  1.5247  .8147 
b( ) u   .9219  .9173  .9134  .9101  .9157  .0051 
Cons./Mean Cons.  .9674  .9898  1.0112  1.0316     
Labor/Mean Labor  .9492  .9839  1.0173  1.0495     
Int. Rate/Mean Int. Rate  1.0822  1.0235  .9709  .9234     
Prices/Mean Prices  1.0331  1.0097  .9883  .9688     
Wages/Mean Wages  .9708  .9903  1.0097  1.0291     
l1/Mean l1  .8171  .9428  1.0627  1.1774     
l2/Mean l2  1.6505  1.1743  .7648  .4103     
Fixed Time Preference 
 
n Vm = = . ; . 3276 14873
 
 
                      A = = = . ; . ; 75 064 0 g t . 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
x   .03  .05  .07  .09  .06  .0258 
q   1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0 
Consumption  .7621  .7795  .7960  .8197  .7873  .0213 
Labor  .6541  .6775  .7001  .7218  .6884  .0291 
Interest Rates  1.2033  1.1396  1.0823  1.0305  1.1139  .0744 
Price Level  .8823  .8626  .8448  .8284  .8545  .0232 
Wage Rate   .5467  .5573  .5680  .5786  .5627  .0137 
l1  .1155  .1416  .1667  .1910  .1537  .0325 
l2  .2789  .1879  .1087  .0395  .1537  .1032 
b   .95  .95  .95  .95  .95  0 
Cons./Mean Cons.  .9680  .9900  1.0110  1.0310     
Labor/Mean Labor  .9502  .9842  1.0170  1.0486     
Int. Rate/Mean Int. Rate  1.0803  1.0231  .9716  .9251     
Prices/Mean Prices  1.0325  1.0095  .9886  .9694     
Wages/Mean Wages  .9717  .9906  1.0094  1.0283     
l1/Mean l1  .7513  .9213  1.0849  1.2426     
l 2/Mean l 2  1.8144  1.2220  .7068  .2560     
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Table 2.  Inflation Tax Effects  
Endogenous Time Preference                     b t
h t ( ) , .
( ) u e
u = =
- + 08;             
u c L c AL A t t t t ( , ) log( ) , . 1 075 - = - = ; 
              c s L t t t = = ” + q g q
g ( ) , . , 1 064 1 
  x ” 005 .   x ” 010 .  
Consumption  .7600  .7113 
Labor  .6513  .5873 
Interest Rates  1.1417  1.2054 
Price Level  .8862  1.0101 
Wage Rate   .5782  .6496 
l1   1.4580  1.7839 
l2   1.4580  1.7839 
b( ) u   .9173  .9126 
n   .3265  .2815 
Vm  11.5354  10.4693 
Fixed Time Preference                                A = = = ” . ; . ; , 75 064 0 1 g t q  
 
  x ” 005 .   x ” 010 .  
Consumption  .7948  .7489 
Labor  .6985  .6364 
Interest Rates  1.1053  1.1579 
Price Level  .8366  .9460 
Wage Rate   .5512  .6152 
l1  .1432  .1925 
l2  .1432  .1925 
b   .95  .95 
n   .3350  .2916 
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h t ( ) , .
( ) u e
u = =
- + 08;            
u c L c AL A t t t t ( , ) log( ) , . 1 075 - = - = ; 
                  c s L t t t = = + q g
g ( ) , . 1 064  
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
x   .05  .05  .05  .05  .05  0 
q   1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.15  .1291 
b( ) u   1.0196  .9459  .8834  .8296  .9196  .0819 
Cons./Mean Cons.  .8788  .9602  1.0407  1.1203  .8757  .0910 
Labor/Mean Labor  1.0155  1.0049  .9947  .9849  .6541  .0086 
Int. Rate/Mean Int. Rate  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.1418  0 
Prices/Mean Prices  1.1286  1.0330  .9531  .8854  .7746  .0812 
Wages/Mean Wages  .9846  .9950  1.0052  1.0152  .5767  .0026 
l1/Mean l1  .9788  .9944  1.0077  1.0191  1.2440  .0216 
l2/Mean l2  1.1087  1.0286  .9606  .9021  1.2440  .1107 
Fixed Time Preference 
 
n Vm = = . ; . 3350 15039
 
 
                      A = = = . ; . ; 75 064 0 g t . 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
x   .05  .05  .05  .05  .05  0 
q   1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.15  .1291 
b   .95  .95  .95  .95  .95  0 
Cons./Mean Cons.  .8696  .9565  1.0435  1.1304  .9141  .1026 
Labor/Mean Labor  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  .6985  0 
Int. Rate/Mean Int. Rate  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.1053  0 
Prices/Mean Prices  1.1391  1.0355  .9492  .8762  .7345  .0832 
Wages/Mean Wages  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  .5512  0 
l1/Mean l1  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  .1432  0 
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                   b t
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( ) u e
u = =
- + 08;            
u c L c AL A t t t t ( , ) log( ) , . 1 075 - = - = ; 
                  c s L t t t = = + q g
g ( ) , . 1 064  
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
x   .075  .075  .025  .025  .05   
q   1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.15  .1291 
b( ) u   1.0146  .9411  .8878  .8338  .9193  .0771 
Cons./Mean Cons.  .9043  .9880  1.0250  1.0927  .8733  .0679 
Labor/Mean Labor  1.0576  1.0464  .9527  .9434  .6583  .0394 
Int. Rate/Mean Int. Rate  .9337  .9337  1.0663  1.0663  1.1463  .0877 
Prices/Mean Prices  1.1008  1.0025  .9807  .9110  .7739  .0608 
Wages/Mean Wages          .5766  .0101 
l1/Mean l1  1.1527  1.1552  .8354  .8567  1.2527  .2229 
l2/Mean l2  .5296  .4913  1.5362  1.4429  1.2527  .7100 
Fixed Time Preference 




                      A = = = . ; . ; 75 064 0 g t . 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
x   .075  .075  .025  .025  .05   
q   1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.15  .1291 
b   .95  .95  .95  .95  .95  0 
Cons./Mean Cons.  .8944  .9838  1.0185  1.0133  .9149  .0791 
Labor/Mean Labor  1.0409  1.0409  .9591  .9591  .7022  .0332 
Int. Rate/Mean Int. Rate  .9353  .9353  1.0647  1.0647  1.1030  .0824 
Prices/Mean Prices  1.1118  1.0107  .9763  .9012  .7293  .0637 
Wages/Mean Wages  1.0238  1.0238  .9762  .9762  .5500  .0151 
l1/Mean l1  1.2275  1.2275  .7725  .7725  .1428  .0375 
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n Vm = = . ; . 33 99206 
                   b t
h t ( ) , .
( ) u e
u = =
- + 08;            
u c L c AL A t t t t ( , ) log( ) , . 1 075 - = - = ; 
                  c s L t t t = = + q g
g ( ) , . 1 064  
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
x   .025  .025  .075  .075  .05   
q   1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.15  .1291 
b( ) u   1.0229  .9491  .8778  .8243  .9185  .0863 
Cons./Mean Cons.  .8539  .9329  1.0659  1.1473  .8828  .1161 
Labor/Mean Labor  .9742  .9639  1.0362  1.0258  .6600  .0239 
Int. Rate/Mean Int. Rate  1.0658  1.0658  .9342  .9342  1.1333  .0861 
Prices/Mean Prices  1.1559  1.0580  .9259  .8602  .7690  .1019 
Wages/Mean Wages  .9600  .9702  1.0296  1.0401  .5752  .0234 
l1/Mean l1  .8003  .8307  1.1833  1.1856  1.22223  .2608 
l 2/Mean l 2  1.6834  1.5619  .3892  .3655  1.22223  .8810 
Fixed Time Preference 
n Vm = = . ; . 3366 15073 
 
 
                      A = = = . ; . ; 75 064 0 g t . 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
x   .025  .025  .075  .075  .05   
q   1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.15  .1291 
b   .95  .95  .95  .95  .95  0 
Cons./Mean Cons.  .8449  .9293  1.0684  1.1574  .9191  .1284 
Labor/Mean Labor  .9591  .9591  1.0409  1.0409  .7022  .0332 
Int. Rate/Mean Int. Rate  1.0647  1.0647  .9353  .9353  1.1030  .0824 
Prices/Mean Prices  1.1662  1.0602  .9222  .8513  .7326  .1031 
Wages/Mean Wages  .9762  .9762  1.0238  1.0238  .5500  .0151 
l1/Mean l1  .7725  .7725  1.2275  1.2275  .1428  .0375 
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Endogenous Time Preference 
 
Fixed Time Preference 
 
Procyclical Monetary Policy 
 
 
              1.9673            
 
 
             1.1833 
 
Deterministic Monetary Policy 
 
 
              2.0845 
 
             1.1966 
 
Countercyclical Monetary Policy 
 
 
              2.1817 
 











h t ( ) , .
( ) u e
u = =
- + 08;            
u c L c AL A t t t t ( , ) log( ) , . 1 075 - = - = ; 
                  c s L t t t = = + q g
g ( ) , . 1 064            
                               
q   1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3 
x   -.1060  -.0989  -.0919  -.0848 
Consumption  .9035  .9938  1.0842  1.1745 
Labor  .8533  .8533  .8533  .8533 
Interest Rates  0  0  0  0 
Price Level  .5810  .5393  .5045  .4751 
Wage Rate   .3937  .4020  .4103  .4185 
l1  0  0  0  0 
l2  0  0  0  0 
b( ) u   1.0039  .9302  .8677  .8183 
Fixed Time Preference                                             A = = = . ; . ; 75 064 0 g t . 
 
q   1.0  1.1  1.2  1.3 
x   -.05  -.05  -.05  -.05 
Consumption  .9035  .9938  1.0842  1.1745 
Labor  .8533  .8533  .8533  .8533 
Interest Rates  0  0  0  0 
Price Level  .6411  .5829  .5343  .4932 
Wage Rate   .4344  .4344  .4344  .4344 
l1  0  0  0  0 
l 2  0  0  0  0 
b   .95  .95  .95  .95 
 





















·  Endogenous Time Preference 




Figure 1.  Optimal Monetary Policy. 
 